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SPRING VALLEY: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND LAND USE 
REGULATION IN A "TAKING" CONTEXT 
By J. Kenneth Wainwright, Jr. * 
INTRODUCTION 
In the recent case of In re Spring Valley Development,l the Su-
preme ,Judicial Court of Maine upheld the constitutionality of the 
Maine Site Location of Development Law. 2 When considered in 
conjunction with other Maine subdivision legislation,3 the decision 
in Sprinf{ Valley represents a significant advance for environmental 
advocates in Maine. The case is philosophically satisfying because 
the judiciary, sub silentio, has ratified a legislative policy determi-
nation that, in regard to the environmental effects of land develop-
ment, "bigger is not necessarily better."( From a legal point of view 
the case presents four important aspects: (1) a legislative policy 
decision to regulate land use in order to achieve the "highest and 
best use" of the natural. environment of the state rather than the 
"most profitable use" of land; (2) a judicial liberalization of the 
amount of state regulation of land use which is allowable before a 
taking of property without compensation will be found; (3) a judi-
cial ratification of the legislative shift of the burden of proof in 
subdivision and land development proceedings before the Environ-
mental Improvement Commission; and (4) an affirmation of the 
requirement that developers and subdividers have and maintain the 
requisite financial capacity and technical ability to comply with 
state air and water pollution control standards. 5 In order to appre-
ciate fully the ramifications of the attitudinal shift which Spring 
Valley represents, it is necessary to examine the case law and legis-
lative context in which it was decided. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of the Taking Concept 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon6 the Supreme Court outlined 
the balancing test to be applied in determining whether governmen-
tal regulation of land use so restricts the owner's use and enjoyment 
of the property as to constitute a "taking of property without 
compensation" in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
struck down a state statute which sought to prevent mining that 
resulted in a subsidence of the topsoil above mineshafts. The Court 
found that the statute made it "commercially impracticable" to 
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mine certain coal owned by the petitioners and that this "commer-
cial impracticability" constituted a "taking" of the petitioner's 
property as certainly as if it had been appropriated by eminent 
doman.' While recognizing that some rights are enjoyed under an 
implied limitation and must yield to valid regulation by the police 
power, the Court held that where the diminution in value caused by 
t he regulation reaches such a level as to constitute a "taking," the 
state must either cease the regulation or compensate the lan-
downer. s Therefore, in the Supreme Court's view, the difference 
het.ween a valid regulation and a "taking" is a difference of degree, 
not kind.!! Moreover, each case of a claimed taking is to be judged 
on it.s own particular facts. III 
As a result of the Pennsylvania Coal opinion, governmental regu-
lation of the use of land is subject to a stricter judicial test than 
other types of governmental regulations. "While other regulations 
are only tested to determine whether they bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to a valid public purpose, land use regulations must be 
tested by balancing the value of the regulation against the loss in 
value to each affected property owner."ll 
Thus, where a court finds that a regulation which deprives the 
owner of his "most profitable use" constitutes a "taking," three 
result.s are likely: (1) since the degree of state interference which will 
be allowed without compensation is lowered, the likelihood that a 
"taking" will be found is increased; (2) because the value of the 
regulation must be balanced against the loss in value to each af-
fected property owner, piecemeal application of an environmental 
regulation may result; and (3) environmental quality will be higher 
in those states with sufficient revenues to afford more frequent com-
pensation of landowners. In states with less money to expend, or in 
times of inflation, the presumable result is that the quality of the 
environment will sufferY 
B. Case law immediately prior to Spring Valley 
In State v. R.B. Johnson, 13 defendant Johnson had applied for a 
permit, under the Maine Wetlands Act, 14 to fill his land. The permit 
was deniedY Johnson began to fill the land anyway, was enjoined 
from further filling by the Superior Court, and appealed from that 
decision on the grounds that it violated his due process rights. The 
Supreme ,Judicial Court agreed that the denial of the permit and the 
injunction against further filling so limited the use of Johnson's land 
as to amount to a taking of property without just compensation and 
an unreasonable exercise of the police power.16 The Johnson court 
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accepted the lower court finding that, absent the addition of fill, 
,Johnson's land" ... has no commercial value whatever."17 The 
language of the opinion reflects the court's concept that a taking 
occurs if land cannot be used for its "most profitable" or "highest 
commercial" use. Such an essentially economic definition of a tak-
ing, if applied broadly, is antithetical to the purposes of environ-
mental legislation, in which the "values" sought to be protected by 
regulating land use are frequently not readily subject to quantifica-
tion. Applying a "most profitable use" standard, the court stated: 
Broadly speaking, deprivation of property contrary to constitutional 
guarantee occurs 'if it deprives an owner of one of its essential attributes, 
destroys its value, restricts or interrupts its common necessary, or profit-
able use, hampers the owner in the application of it to the purposes of 
trade, or imposes conditions upon the right to hold or use it and thereby 
seriously impairs its value.' (emphasis added)18 
Analogizing the Wetlands Act to a zoning ordinance, the court noted 
that land use is always subject to reasonable police power regula-
tions.!!' However, it concluded that the area regulated by the act is 
a valuable resource of the state; and, since the benefits derived from 
enjoining ,Johnson would theoretically be state-wide, the cost of 
compensating Johnson should be borne publicly. "To leave appel-
lants with commercially valueless land in upholding the restrictions 
presently imposed, is to charge them with more than their just share 
of the cost of this state-wide conservation program, granting fully 
its commendable purpose. "20 
The Johnson decision exemplifies the result of applying a "most 
profitable" land use definition in environmental litigation. The case 
has been criticized, notwithstanding the fact that the court limited 
its holding to the particular facts ofthe case. 21 It has been suggested 
that the injunction did not deprive the land owner of an existing use 
of his property, but merely prevented him from acquiring a new use 
made possible by the fill operation,22 and therefore required an un-
warranted expansion of the taking concept. The result has also been 
criticized on policy grounds for protecting Johnson's right to engage 
in land speculation at the expense of the public interest in preserv-
ing the marshland. 23 
Another case, King Resources Co. v. Environmental Improve-
ment Commission, 2~ presented the first challenge to an administra-
t ive action under the Site Location Law. The plaintiff purchased an 
oil terminal from the United States and expended $522,500.0025 on 
the project prior to January 1, 1970. The Environmental Improve-
ment Commission filed a letter of protest before the Army Corps of 
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Engineers on the plaintiff's application for permission to construct 
a new dock at the facility, pending a study of the project's overall 
environmental impact by the Commission. The Commission also 
determined that the development was subject to its jurisdiction.26 
Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before the Commission under protest 
of the Commission's jurisdictional decision and requested the issu-
ance of a license, to proceed with the development. When the" Com-
mission refused to grant the license, King Resources sought declara-
tory relief in the Supreme Judicial Court claiming that its particular 
development was not within the purview of the Site Location Law.27 
The court found for the plaintiff and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. The court held that, although the Site Location Law 
did vest the Environmental Improvement Commission with powers 
of control and regulation of industrial and commercial develop-
ments for the express purpose of minimizing the impact of such 
developments on the environment,28 this particular development 
was excluded from Commission control. Citing the applicability 
provision of the Site Location Law,29 the court noted that this devel-
opment was under construction prior to January 1, 1970 and there-
fore was not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.30 Like 
Johnson before it, King Resources presented a factual situation dis-
tinctly unfavorable to the environmental interests. In light of the 
applicability provision of the Site Location Law, the Environmental 
Improvement Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over the King 
development was arguably ultra vires. 
Thus, the period 1970-1973 saw attempts by the Environmental 
Improvement Commission31 to discover the limits of its jurisdiction 
and develop effective administrative procedures.32 The period before 
Sprin/! Valley also saw the Maine courts applying a "most profitable 
use" standard to determine if an environmentally motivated admin-
istrative action constituted a taking without compensation.33 The 
result of the application of such a standard in environmentallitiga-
tion was to give: 
. . . the police power a narrow role in any state program for protecting 
natural resources, and thus has made a clean environment hostage to 
private property ... The court has forced taxpayers to pay for main-
taining privately owned land in its natural condition, worthless for pri-
vate purposes, when the natural condition is of greater public value than 
would be its changed condition. In this day when land in its natural 
state is no longer a frontier to be peopled but a rare asset to be preserved, 
this result appears inconsistent with the historic purpose of judge-made 
property law to improve the social condition.34 
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c. The Site Location Law 
In 1970 the Maine Legislature enacted P.L. 1969, Special Session 
1D70, c. 571. Section one of the law declares the legislative purpose 
to he maintenance of the "highest and best use of the natural 
environment of the State.";)5 As will be discussed later, when con-
fronted with a taking issue in the Spring Valley case, the Supreme 
.J udicial Court adopted this new declaration of legislative purpose36 
and reached a revised assessment of what consitututes a reasonable 
reKulation of land vis-a-vis an unconstitutional taking by onerous 
regulation. 
Section two of the statute embodies the Site Location Law,37 
which vests the Environmental Improvement Commission38 with 
authority under the state police power to insure that developments 
suhstantially affecting the local environment would be so located as 
to have minimal impact.:l9 The law seeks to regulate large develop-
ments, defining a "development which may substantially affect the 
environment" as any commercial or industrial development which: 
(1) requires a license from the Environmental Improvement Com-
mission; (2) occupies a land area in excess of twenty acres, or which 
contemplates excavating natural resources; or (3) occupies on a 
single parcel a structure or structures larger than 60,000 square 
feet. III The "natural environment of a locality" is defined to include 
" ... the character, quality and uses of land, air and waters in the 
area likely to be affected by such development, and the degree to 
which such land, air and waters are free from non-naturally occuring 
contamination. "II Subdivisions were added to the list of "develop-
ments which may substantially affect the environment" in 1972.42 
Suhdivisions are defined as parcels in excess of twenty acres which 
are divided into at least five lots and offered for sale or lease during 
any five year period. 4:1 
Procedurally, before a developer or subdivider can commence 
operation of the development, he is required to notify the Commis-
sion in writing of his intent and of the nature and location of the 
development. 14 Within thirty days45 the Commission may either 
approve or disapprove the development or schedule a hearing on the 
developer's application. If the Commission disapproves a develop-
ment without a hearing, the aggrieved developer may request a 
hearing, and one will be granted based upon his objections to the 
Commission's findings and conclusions. 46 
From an environmental viewpoint, sections 484 and 485 of the 
Site Location Law are most attractive and demonstrate the greatest 
degree of legislative response to the environmental crisis. Section 
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4R4 requires that the developer or subdivider have the financial 
capacity to meet air and water pollution standards and that he 
maintain that financial capacity until such standards have been 
complied withY The law also requires that the development have 
no adverse effect upon traffic movement, the natural environment, 
and soil types.~s Essentially, the law subjects developers' and subdi-
viders' ecological conduct to ongoing administrative review, until 
such time as they have insured the preservation of the environment 
as related to their developments. The financial provisions of the Site 
Location Law become more meaningful when considered in con-
junction with other Maine subdivision and zoning legislation. The 
Municipal Regulaition of Land Subdivisions Act49 sets out explicit 
guidelines to be followed by planning boards and municipal officers 
in promulgating subdivision regulations.50 The act is almost a verba-
tim copy of a Vermont land use and development statute. 51 How-
ever, like the Site Location Law and unlike its Vermont counter-
part, the Municipal Regulation of Land Subdivisions Act places the 
burden of proof with respect to compliance with its guidelines 
squarely upon the proponent of the development. 52 Unlike the Site 
Location Law, the Municipal Regulation of Land Subdivisions Act 
and its standards apply to all subdivisions of three or more lots. 53 
The cumulative effect of the Site Location Law and the Municipal 
Regulation of Land Subdivisions Act is to subject a proposed subdi-
vision to stringent examination of its environmental impact while 
still in the planning stages and also to impose upon the subdivider 
an affirmative burden to prove that he has the financial and techni-
cal capacity to assure compliance with the environmental standards 
set by the legislation. 54 
Section 484 of the Site Location Law also provides that, at any 
hearing, the burden of proof shall rest with the proponent of the 
development. 55 Such statutory shifts of the burden of proof are not 
novei"H and have been upheld in the courtsY Without such a legisla-
tive shift of the burden of proof, the Environmental Improvement 
Commission would have to bear the burden in the often factually 
complex situations associated with environmental adjudications, 
resulting in an overall decline in the Commission's efficiency under 
the statue.5S The burden-shifting process also evidences a public 
policy which regards the public environment as superior to private 
gain, a policy compatible with the "highest and best use" concept 
of allowable regulation envisioned by the statute and upheld by the 
court in Spring Valley. 59 
In the case of a person who does not notify the Environmental 
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Improvement Commission of his intentions and the location of his 
development, and in the event that the Commission denies him 
permission to continue his development after a hearing, section 485 
empowers the Commission to order such a person" ... to restore 
the area affected by such construction or operation to its condition 
prior thereto or as near as may be, to the satisfication of the commis-
sion."lili The statute thus serves to cast upon the non-complying 
developer the additional burden of insuring against the detrimental 
effects of his non-compliance. By rendering a developer's financial 
condition subject to administrative review and alternatively by ren-
dering the non-complying developer a self-insurer, these Maine stat-
utes envision more stringent and activist control of potential pollu-
ters than federal environmental legislationY 
The situation in Maine prior to Spring Valley was thus character-
ized by two cOIlfiicting trends. On the one hand, the courts applied 
traditional concepts to determine if a taking had occured. On the 
other hand, the legislature had issued a strong statement of legisla-
tive purpose which did not fit within the traditional quantitative 
framework by which a court determined whether a taking had oc-
cured. 
Between the public interest in braking and eventually stopping the 
insidious despoliation of our natural resources which have for so long 
been taken for granted, on the one hand, and the protection of appel-
lants' property rights on the other, the issue is cast. 62 
II. THE CASE 
The controversy leading to In re Spring Valley Development began 
when Lakesites, Inc. subdivided a 92 acre tract located at Raymond 
Pond in Raymond, Maine. 63 The subdivider did not notify the Envi-
ronmental Improvement Commission of the development although 
it exceeded the statutory limit of twenty acres. However, the Com-
mission learned of the development and scheduled a hearing. AI-
t hough the subdivider was given notice and was represented at the 
hearing, it refused to offer evidence or cross-examine any witnesses, 
contending that "a mere subdivision does not constitute a 'commer-
cial or industrial' development" within the purview of the Site Lo-
cation Law.'H The Commission made detailed findings,65 concluded 
that Lakesites had failed to meet the standards66 of the Site Loca-
tion Law, and issued an order for Lakesites to discontinue the devel-
opment until the subdivider made a proper application to the Com-
mission and was granted the right to proceed by the Commission. 
Lakesites appealed the Commission order to the Supreme Judicial 
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CourtHi reiterating its contention that mere subdivisions are not 
embraced by the Site Location Law and challenging the constitu-
tionality of the act as applied on due process and equal protection 
grounds. 
A. Applicability of the Site Location Law to Subdividers 
Lakesites' attack upon the applicability of the Site Location Law 
was two-pronged. The subdivider contended: (1) residential devel-
opments were not "commercial and industrial developments;" and 
(2) a subdivision, qua subdivision, could have no adverse ecological 
impact since the law was directed not at the subdivider but at the 
actual polluter. As in King Resources,68 the Spring Valley court 
examined the legislative history of the Site Location Law to deter-
mine its applicability. Concentrating upon the legislative definition 
of "developments which may substantially affect the environ-
ment, "H!! the court held that the act was aimed at two types of 
developments: (1) those whose operating procedures included the 
consumption of natural resources or whose operation resulted in the 
discharge of wastes and residues which lower the quality of sur-
rounding air, soil, and/or water; and (2) those which, while not 
inherently ecologically destructive, because of their size and concen-
tration are likely to impose great stress on the environment.io 
The court held that the term "commercial" was intended to de-
scribe the motivation for the development and not the nature of the 
activity to be performed on the property subsequent to develop-
ment," and found the business of subdividing large tracts of land 
and selling lots to be a commercial venture within the meaning of 
the act. it Relying on legislative history,13 the court noted that the 
Environmental Improvement Commission's assertion of jurisdiction 
over residential subdivisions had been called to the legislature's 
attention and that that body had defeated bills whose purpose 
would have been to exclude certain residential subdivisions from the 
Commission's jurisdiction.i4 Not content to base its findings on the 
legislature's "negative acquiesence" in the Commission's assertion 
of jurisdiction over subdivisions, the court considered the history of 
a subsequent amendment which made clear, by affirmative promul-
gation, that subdivisions were within the scope of the Site Location 
Law.':; 
The court further held that the Site Location Law applied to 
commercially motivated residential developments where the devel-
oper merely plots the tract, subdivides the tract by plan (i.e., absent 
physical effect upon the land itself), and offers the lots for sale. i6 In 
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short, the court accepted the legislative determination that large 
developments are subject to administrative review of their ecologi-
cal impact even in the planning stage. Such a perspective reflects a 
realistic approach to the protection of environmental values. If re-
view is possible only after a project has been initiated, irreparable 
damage may already have been done, notwithstanding subsequent 
administrative prohibition of further development. 77 
By holding developments subject to review in the planning stage, 
the court disposed of Lakesites' corollary contention: that as a mere 
subdivider, its acts could not harm the land and, since the Site 
Location Law was aimed at activities which resulted in harm to the 
land, Lakesites was outside of the act's scope. Lakesites' contention 
was based on the traditional equitable notion that an individual's 
activities will be restrained only when the individual himself is the 
party responsible for the damage. 7o Lakesites argued that the real 
damage resulted not from subdivision and sale of the land, but from 
activities subsequent to sale, by parties other than the subdivider. 
The court refuted the notion that only the last, damaging polluter 
is subject to injunction. Stressing the preventive nature of the act, 
the court reasoned: 
We would hardly expect that the Legislature intended to postpone the 
determination of suitability of an area for residential development until 
the lots had been sold to purchasers who will, upon starting 
construction, discover that they are participants in-as well as victims 
of-a local environmental disaster.79 
Holding the act of subdivision to be the first step in a development 
which may substantially affect the environment,80 the court implic-
itly recognized that review at the planning stage was most rationally 
related to the statutory goal and held the Spring Valley develop-
ment to be subject to the Site Location Law. 
B. Police Power and Regulation of Property 
Lakesites' second major contention was that the Site Location 
Law was an unconstitutional exercise of the police power. Presum-
ing the validity of the law, the court cast the burden upon Lakesites 
to support its claim of unconstitutionality.81 Recognizing that the 
state may exercise the police power to protect the public health, 
safety, welfare, morals and order,82 the court ruled that within this 
authority the state may act to conserve the quality of air, soil, and 
water.X:l The court noted the general proposition that a landowner 
holds his property subject to the limitation that his use of the prop-
erty may not be to a public disadvantage84 and concluded that: 
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. the limitation of use of property for the purpose of preserving from 
unreasonable destruction the quality of air, soil and water for the protec-
tion of the public health and welfare is within the police power."" 
C. Due Process Challenge 
While Lakesites did not contest the power of the state to act 
properly under the police power to protect the environment, it did 
suggest that the Site Location Law was: (1) not rationally related 
to its purpose; (2) a depriviation of property without compensation; 
and (3) void for vagueness. The present state of the law requires a 
double test to uphold state regulation of private property in the 
public interest.S6 The two elements are that: (1) the public interest 
requires such state interference; and (2) the means employed by the 
state are reasonably related to the goal sought to be achieved. 
Probably not caring to argue against the public interest in preserv-
ing the environment, Lakesites attacked the Site Location Law on 
the grounds that it was not reasonably related to a legitimate state 
purpose. 
1. Rational Relation of the Site Location Law to its Purpose 
In its due process argument Lakesites again advanced the conten-
tion that the mere act of subdivision does not cause any impact 
upon the environment, so that application of the act to a subdivision 
is not directly related to the act's purposes. The court observed that 
since subdivision is the first step in development, it is more efficient 
to subject the instrumentality to review while it is controlled by one 
subdivider, rather than to delay until a later time when (as in the 
case of Spring Valley) the actions of 90 separate property owners 
would be impossible to review as a practical matter. S7 
The approach of the Maine court is reasonable. Arguably, many 
forms of pollution may be characterized as the cumulative result of 
several acts, S8 anyone of which standing alone would not amount 
to a nuisance. s9 From a regulatory viewpoint, the difficulty arises in 
that the individual acts may be deemed reasonable and therefore 
not enjoinable as a nuisance, while the totality of those acts results 
in pollution. Although some courts have held that individually inno-
cent acts may become actionable torts if they combine to cause 
damage,911 such an approach is insufficient because of its ex post 
facto character. While it may subject the individual polluters to 
liability, it does nothing to prevent the act of polluting. However, 
the Spring Valley court, by holding that the regulations of the Site 
Location Law applied to the development beginning with the act of 
subdivision, did achieve the preventive purpose of the statue. Be-
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cause environmental legislation is designed to prevent ecological 
despoliation,~l the rational relation of an environmental statue to its 
purposes assumes a new proportion. To determine whether a partic-
ular environmental statute is rationally related to its purpose, the 
courts should look not only to the activity of the defendant to which 
the statute is applied, but also to the condition of the land at the 
time of that activity. Thus, the lesser the degree of pollution at the 
time when an environmental statute is applied, the greater the ra-
tional relation of the application of that statute to the achievement 
of its preventive purposes. Such a test is recommended because it 
recognizes (1) the essentially preventive character of environmental 
legislation and (2) the cum ulati ve causal relationship underlying 
environmental pollution. 
2. Deprivation of Property Without Compensation 
The court summarily dismissed Lakesites' contention that the 
Commission's act in preventing the subdivison to the extent envi-
sioned by Lakesites was an uncompensated taking.92 The scarcity of 
discussion on the "taking" issue in the opinion is due to the absence 
of data on the record below, 9:1 which precluded all but the most 
cursory appellate review on this point. On the basis of this limited 
record, the court found that the Commission order merely prevented 
the appellants from selling their land while subdivided to the extent 
originally planned. In this the court found no deprivation of prop-
erty, because reasonable use of the property was still possible.9~ 
The prevailing view today is that an otherwise valid police power 
regulation which restricts the use of property will not constitute a 
"taking" of property requiring compensation95 unless the regulation 
unreasonably precludes a reasonable use of the property96 or results 
in such a decrease in the value of the property as to be onerous. 97 
The "most profitable use" versus the "highest and best use" labels 
become relevant when a court attempts to make this determination. 
If a court holds a regulation which deprives the landowner of the 
'most profitable use" of his property to constitute a taking, environ-
mental concerns could suffer because a state would have to be pre-
pared either to compensate the landowner, or to forego the environ-
mental regulation. However, if a court is provided with a clear state-
ment by the legislature that the regulations are of overriding public 
importance and necessary to preserve the "highest and best use" of 
lands within the state (as was provided in the Site Location Law), 
environmental concerns will be promoted because the need for the 
regulations will outweigh the effect upon use and value in all but 
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the most extreme cases,UK The Spring Valley court ruled against the 
subdivider chiefly because of the lack of a record. 99 However, it is 
not unreasonable to speculate that, had there been a record, the 
court, guided by the legislature's statement of purpose in the Site 
Location Law, would have reached the same result. lOll 
Other state courts have employed strong statements of legislative 
purpose to validate environmental regulations which had been con-
fronted with a "taking" challenge. In Turnpike Realty v. The Town 
of Dedham, 1111 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court approved 
a zoning plan designed to preserve sections of the Charles River 
flood plain. The court stressed the overriding public purpose found 
in Dedham's zoning bylaws which stated in part: 
'(1) The purpose of the Flood Plain District is to preserve and maintain 
the ground water table; to protect the public health and safety, persons 
and property against the hazards of flood water inundation ... and to 
conserve natural conditions, wild life, and open spaces for the education, 
recreation and general welfare of the public.'1II2 
Although the plaintiff argued that the regulation resulted in an 88% 
diminution in the value of its property, the court upheld the zoning 
ordinance on the basis of the strong public purpose to be achieved. 10:1 
In Just v. Marinette County,1I14 a case factually similar to 
Johnson, the plaintiffs challenged an injunction prohibiting them 
from further filling their shoreline property. Such filling was prohib-
ited by a county zoning ordinance based on a state model. Recogniz-
ing the public purposes of the zoning ordinance lO5 the Wisconsin 
Supeme Court observed: 
The .Justs argue their property has been severly depreciated in value. 
But this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the land in its 
natural state but on what the land would be worth if it could be filled 
and used for the location of a dwelling. While loss of value is to be 
considered in determing whether a restriction is a constructive taking, 
value based upon changing the character of the land at the expense of 
harm to public rights is not an essential factor or controlling. illS 
Because of its close factual similarity to Johnson, Just illustrates 
the efficacy of the "public purpose" hypothesis as a method to 
validate an environmental regulation which has been challenged as 
a "taking." Proceeding with a traditional taking analysis, the Maine 
court found a taking in Johnson where the Wetlands Act prohibited 
the plaintiff from changing the character of his property. In Just, 
the Wisconsin court, focusing on the overriding public purpose of 
the regulation, prevented the plaintiffs from acquiring a new use by 
changing the character of their land and validated the regulation. 
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In Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserva-
tion and Development Commission, 107 the court sustained the defen-
dant Commission's order prohibiting the plaintiff from filling its 
land abutting San Francisco Bay. Upholding the validity of the 
regulations against a "taking" challenge, the court made reference 
to the legislature's strong statement of public purpose: 
In those sections the Legislature has determined that the bay is the most 
valuable single natural resource of the entire region and changes in one 
part of the bay may also affect all other parts; that the present uncoordi-
nated, haphazard manner in which the bay is being filled threatens the 
bay itself and is therfore inimical to the welfare of both present and 
future residents of the bay area; and that a regional approach is neces-
sary to protect the public interest in the bay. IllS 
Viewed in conjunction with Turnpike Realty, Just and 
Candlestick Properties, Spring Valley stands for the proposition 
that overriding public purposes (a qualitative difference) can sup-
port an environmental regulation even though the resultant diminu-
tion in use or value may be great, as contrasted with Pennsylvania 
Coal's quantitative approach where a taking is found when the dim-
inution in use or value exceeds a certain undefined point. 
3. Vagueness and Impossibility of Compliance in Terms of the Site 
Location Law 
Commentators have criticized the Site Location Law as unclear 
and lacking workable standards. 109 Lakesites claimed that the stan-
dards of the act llO which they were forced to meet were vague and 
impossible of compliance, and pointed out that they could not be 
expected to forsee what activities would be performed on the land 
once sold. 11I The court rejected this contention, ruling that the sub-
divider could meet this responsibility by showing that conditions in 
his instruments of sale required subsequent compliance of later 
owners of the fee with the standards of the Site Location Law." 2 The 
court's suggestion, if adopted, would assure that a "highest and best 
use" standard, once applied to the subdivider, would also be applied 
to subsequent owners of the fee. 
Lakesites' most direct challenge on vagueness grounds was di-
rected against that portion of the law which requires that the pro-
posed development have "no adverse effect upon the natural envi-
ronment. "m Finding that the act was aimed at preventing the 
unreasonable effect of development upon existing uses, scenic char-
acter and natural resources, the court held that the act contained 
sufficiently specific standards with which the developer must com-
ply."l 
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As originally drafted, the Site Location Law did contain one stan-
dard which the court found impossible of compliance. The act re-
quired that the proposed development have no adverse effect upon 
property values.1\r. Lakesites contended that such a provision was 
unconstitutional. The court agreed, holding that the effect of devel-
opments upon property values is outside the scope and purposes of 
the Site Location Law. If the Environmental Improvement Com-
mission were to deny approval of a development because the devel-
oper had failed to prove that property values would not be adversely 
affected, the court ruled that this would be an impermissible appli-
cation of the police power. However, in light of the rest of the case, 
Lakesites' victory on this point can only be considered pyrrhic. I IS 
D. Equal Protection Challenge 
Lakesites's final constitutional argument was that the Site Loca-
tion Law, by requiring only subdivisions of an area greater than 
twenty acres to receive the Commission's approval, denied equal 
protection of the laws, because size alone has no rational relation 
to the environmental impact of a development. The court observed 
that the legislature had evidently concluded that the the size of 
development does have a distinct relationship to the amount of its 
potential adverse impact.1I7 Noting that the legislature may draw 
lines which standing alone would appear arbitrary, but which none-
theless must be upheld if reasonable and rationally related to the 
legislative purpose, the court sustained the twenty acre limit of the 
Site Location Law.IIK Arguing from dicta in King Resourcesl19 which 
had analogized the Site Location Law to a zoning ordinance, Lake-
sites contended that the results of case by case application of the 
law was tantamount to "piecemeal zoning"120 which created arbi-
trary distinctions between developments. While both zoning ordi-
nances and the Site Location Law restrict the use of land, the court 
distinguished them. Stating that the Site Location Law" ... is not 
concerned with where a development takes place in general but only 
that the development takes place in a manner consistent with the 
needs of the public for a healthy environment,"121 the court found 
no arbitrary distinctions. It is important to note, as the court did, 
that the Site Location Law, despite its title, does not dictate the 
location of a development, but rather states that any development, 
regardless of location, must be constructed in compliance with the 
law's standards. The same standards are applied in each case. Any 
distinction in result arises, not from the application of different 
standards, but from case by case factual distinctions to which the 
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standards are applied. 
Holding that the Environmental Improvement Commission acted 
"regularly and within the scope of its authority," the court affirmed 
the Commission's decision and denied Lakesites' appeal. l22 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
The Maine court's strong affirmation of legislative purpose in 
Spring Valley bears legal and environmental significance in several 
respects: 
(1) The court has upheld the legislature's policy decision to regulate 
land use so as to achieve the "highest and best use" of the natural 
environment of the state. Strongly re-affirming the right of the state to 
limit property use for the purpose of preserving the environment,12:\ the 
court adopted the declaration of legislative purpose accompanying the 
Site Location Law and applied it in determining what constitutes a 
"reasonable regulation of land" as opposed to an "unconstitutional tak-
ing by onerous regulation." Such an approach constitutes a marked 
divergence from the rationale used in the Johnson case by the same 
court. Juxtaposition of the two cases suggests that, where there is a 
clear statement by the legislature that the purposes of the regulation 
are of overriding public importance, the regulations will be sustained by 
the court when confronted with a "taking" challenge in all but the most 
extreme cases. The Turnpike Realty, Just and Candlestick Properties 
cases also demonstrate the potential of the "public purpose" hypothesis 
as a method of sustaining environmental regulations which have been 
opposed as "takings. "121 
(2) Application of a public purpose designed to promote the "highest 
and best use" of land also assures that all states, regardless of their 
financial capabilities, will be able to preserve their environments 
through legislation. The Johnson court viewed the gains of environmen-
tal protection as state-wide in nature and found the attempt at regula-
tion of use in that case to be a "taking" which would have required 
compensation if it were to be upheld. 125 The corollary of such a viewpoint 
is that a larger proportion of environmentally motivated regulations 
potentially may be found to be "takings" requiring compensation. Such 
a viewpoint directly relates a state's environmental quality to the state's 
ability to pay for it. However, in Spring Valley, because of the legislative 
command to consider the "highest and best use," the regulation was not 
found to constitute a "taking," and compensation was not required. The 
lesson of Spring Valley is that environmental quality need not be inex-
tricably bound to the financial capacity of a state. By re-defining ac-
ceptable uses, the legislature can at least partially counteract the anti-
environmental effects of inflation. 
(3) SprinR Valley also emphasizes another pro-environmental tool 
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which the legislatures and courts may employ. By shifting the burden 
of proof onto the potential polluter, the Site Location Law has freed the 
administrative body from having to carry complex burdens of proof. 
While a de facto shift could also be achieved by ree}uiring the adminis-
trator to make a positive finding that no ecological harm will result from 
the proposed development, such a device has been criticized as depend-
ing too heavily on the official's attitudes and beliefs. '26 Ah explicit statu-
tory shift of the burden has three results: (a) it frees the administrative 
agency from complex burdens, thus increasing" the agency's efficiency 
and scope of coverage; (b) it evidences a clear public policy which re-
gards the preservation of the environment as superior to private, specu-
lative gain; and (c) it subjects proposed uses of a particular tract to the 
same close administrative review as existing uses. This last result is 
desirable because such proposed uses are uniquely within the knowledge 
of the proponent of a particular development. However, when a legisla-
ture shifts the burdens of proof, it should also be careful to delineate 
clear and explicit standards to negate any potential due process chal-
lenge to the statute on vagueness grounds. 
(4) The judicial approval of the financial provisions of the Site Loca-
tion Law is also significant. By requiring a developer to have the finan-
cial and technical capabilities to meet the standards of the law and to 
maintain those capabilities until such standards are met, continuing 
review of a development after initial approval is assured. The financial 
provisions of the law also serve to insure that the environment will be 
entrusted to developers with the capacity to bear their public trust. The 
provision of the Site Location Law which requires a non-approved devel-
oper to restore an area under unauthorized development to its prior 
condition (or as close thereto as possible), 127 serves to increase developer 
compliance with the law, for any developer who would attempt to ignore 
it is rendered a self-insurer of his conduct. Application of the explicit 
standards of the Municipal Regulation of Land Subdivisions Act, and 
the financial capacity review provisions of both acts helps assure the 
presence of both legitimate developers and legitimate developments. '2x 
(5) By holding that the Site Location Law applied to a mere subdivi-
der, and by upholding the reviewability of developments in the planning 
stage, the court recognized that, in an environmental context, 
preventive legislation is the only meaningful kind. The court viewed 
subdivision as the first stage in a potential pollution causation chain 
and felt that review at that point was not only proper, but also the most 
reasonable course of action to follow. In assessing the rational relation 
to the purpose of future environmental legislation, it is suggested that 
courts focus not only on the activity of the defendant to which the 
statute is applied, but also on the condition of the land at the time when 
the statute is applied. The closer the land is to its unspoiled state when 
regulation is applied, the more rationally related that regulation is to 
its preventive purpose.129 Moreover, courts must recognize the essen-
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tially cumulative causal nature of pollution and act to enjoin it at the 
earliest possible point, notwithstanding the contrary traditional equita-
ble viewpoint. l :w 
(6) By interpreting the word "commercial" (as used in the Site Loca-
tion Law) to apply to the motivation for a development, rather than to 
the activity conducted on the property subsequent to development, the 
Sprinl{ Valle.v court followed the clear directive of legislative intent and 
gave the Site Location Law a broad scope of application. Such an inter-
pretation brought residential developments squarely within the purivew 
of the act. Since residential developments account for the majority of 
construction,I:11 their exclusion would have been illogical and might have 
seriously jeopardized the overall effectiveness of the law. 
Spring Valley represents a clear judicial affirmation of le..gislation 
designed to prevent environmental deterioration. The decision indi-
cates that where a statutory statement of public purpose is present, 
more and farther reaching land use regulations will be allowed be-
fore an uncompensated "taking" is found by the courts. By subordi" 
nating the right of private speculative gain to the public interest in 
environmental preservation, the Maine Legislature and Supreme 
Judicial Court have strengthened environmentally motivated land 
use regulation. 
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for disposal of effluents; and the applicable state and local health and 
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B. Has sufficient water available for the reasonably foreseeable 
needs of the subdivision; 
C. Will not cause an unreasonable burden on an existing water 
supply, if one is to be utilized; 
D. Will not cause unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the ca-
pacity of the land to hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy 
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repealedl; 
1. Will not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural 
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3. Lakesites, Inc. has sold, is selling or is planning to sell or otherwise 
transfer interests in and to said lots to purchasers as a commercial 
venture, such lots to be used for year round or seasonal residential 
and/or recreational purposes. 
4. Lakesites, Inc. has been and is operating a commercial development 
within the meaning of Title 38 M.R.S.A. section 482 (2). 
5. Lakesites, Inc. has made no application to nor submitted any evi-
dence at the hearing held by the E.I.C. for approval pursuant to the Site 
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Location of Development Law, although it was given ample opportunity 
to do so. 
6. The record indicated that most of the soil in the area being devel-
oped by Lakesites, Inc. is of a steep slope and has a high seasonable 
water table. 
7. The record indicated that most of the soil in the area is unsuitable 
for septic tank disposal of domestic sewage. 
8. The development has been subdividied in such a fashion so that it 
will support housing for 90 families, all of whom must dispose of domes-
tic sewage in some manner. 
9. Since the developer, Lakesites, Inc., has not indicated that it has 
made any provision for collection, treatment or disposal of such sewage, 
and no municipal treatment and disposal system exists in the vicinity 
of the development, the only alternative is underground disposal of such 
sewage by means of a septic tank or related system. 
10. The installation of up to 90 septic tank disposal systems in and 
upon the said development could degrade the quality of ground water 
in and around the said development, such ground water possibly being 
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Site Location Law. L.D. 963 was defeated. 300 A.2d 736, 743 (Me., 
1973). L.D. 1061, 105th Legislature, 1971, stated its purpose as: 
The Environmental Improvement Commission has asserted authority 
under the site location law passed at the Special Session over residential 
developments, even though the statute is limited to 'commercial and 
industrial developments.' This bill would clarify that this is not the 
intent of the law. (Statement of Fact accompanying L. D. 1061, 105th 
Legislature, 1971.) 
L.D. 1061 was also defeated. Id. 
HWhen an interpretation of a statute by an administrative body 
has been called to the attention of the legislature, the legislature's 
failure to act to change the administrative interpretation is evidence 
of legislative acquiescence in the interpretation. In re Spring Valley 
Development, 300 A. 2d 736,743 (Me., 1973). See also Androscoggin 
Savings Bank v. Campbell, 282 A. 2d 858, 864-5 (Me., 1971); Bur-
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rough of Matawan v. Monmouth County Board of Taxation, 51 N.J. 
291, 300, 240 A. 2d 8, 13 (1968); 2 Sutherland, STATUTES AND STATU-
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burden is on the state to show a "compelling state interest" suffi-
cient to outweigh the infringement. 
x2Prudentiai Insurance Co. of America v. Insurance Commis-
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A. 2d 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1973); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393,417-20 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting opinion). 
Xa300 A. 2d 736, 748 (Me., 1973). 
x6Goidbiatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-5 (1961). 
xi300 A. 2d 736, 749 (Me., 1973). 
xX"Environmental problems seldom stem from simple causes. 
Rather they usually arise out of the interplay of many contributing 
circumstances." ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, The First Annual Report 
of the Council on Environmental Quality (August, 1970) as cited in 
Rabin, et al., THE POLLUTION CRISIS: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, at 10, 
(Oceana, 1972). 
X9See generally Prosser, W.L., LAW OF TORTS, 4th Ed., at 322-3,608 
(West, 1971). 
llliId. See also Warren v. Parkhurst, 45 Misc. 466, 92 N.Y.S. 725 
(1904). 
lllSee, e.g., 38 M.R.S.A. § 361 (Supp. 1973), supra n. 35; National 
Environmental Policy Act, Congressional Declaration of Purpose, 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (1970); Clean Air Act, Congressional Declaration of 
Purpose, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (b)(2) (1970). 
92300 A. 2d 736, 749 (Me., 1973). 
!J:ILakesites had refused to present evidence or cross-examine wit-
nesses before the Environmental Improvement Commission. 300 A. 
2d 736, 740 (Me., 1973). Because Lakesites had failed to introduce 
evidence as to the valuation of its property or evidence as to the 
effect of regulation on that valuation, the court lacked the necessary 
elements to allow it to engage in a traditional Pennsylvania Coal 
type of balancing test, and hence disposed of Lakesites' claim sum-
marily. 
!J~300 A. 2d 736, 749 (Me., 1973). 
!laGolden V. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 
285 N.E. 2d 291, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138, 154-5 (1972), appeal dismissed, 
409 U.S. 1003 (1972); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 
590, 593 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-7 
(1926). 
l'6Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y. 2d 221, 225, 275 
N.E.2d 585, 588 (1971). 
!l7Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) 
(dicta); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 
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(1922). But see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), where 
a diminution in value from $800,000 to $60,000 was upheld. 
!IKCompare the results in State v. RB. Johnson, 265 A. 2d 711 
(Me., 1970); Bartlett v. Zoning Commission of Town of Olde Lyme, 
161 Conn. 24, 282 A. 2d 907 (1971); and Harbor Farms, Inc. v. 
Nassau County Planning Commission, 40 A.D. 2d 517,334 N.Y.S. 
2d 412 (1972); with Bortz Coal Co. v. Department of Environmental 
Resources, 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 362, 299 A. 2d 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct., 
1973), where the court, applying legislatively set standards of allow-
able use, was bound to find against the appellant-polluter although 
sympathetic to him. 
111138 M.RS.A. § 487 (Supp. 1973) provides that appeals from a 
decision of the Environmental Improvement Commission are made 
directly to the Supreme Judicial Court. Procedures before the Su-
preme Judicial Court are not de novo and review is limited to the 
application, the hearing record and the Commission's order. The 
Commission's order is to be sustained if supported by substantial 
evidence. 
11111300 A. 2d 736, 751 (Me., 1973). See infra, n. 114. 
1111 __ Mass. __ , 284 N.E. 2d 891 (1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 
1108 (1972). (Hereinafter cited as Turnpike Realty.) 
1112Id. at 894. 
1II:IId. at 900. 
111456 Wisc. 2d 7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). (Hereinafter cited as 
Just.) 
10;'56 Wisc. 2d 7, 10, 201 N.W.2d 761,765 (1972). 
1111156 Wisc. 2d 7, 23, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771 (1972). 
10711 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970). (Hereinafter cited 
as Candlestick Properties.) 
IUKU Cal. App. 3d 557, 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1970). See 
generally Bosselman, supra n. 11, at 260-5. 
IIII1Walter, supra n. 32, at 337. 
lIuSee supra n. 5(1), 48. 
IIISee also Walter, supra n. 32, at 338. 
112300 A. 2d 736, 750 (Me., 1973). 
1J;138 M.RS.A. § 484 (3) (Supp. 1973). See supra n. 48. 
114300 A. 2d 736, 751-2 (Me., 1973) . 
. . . The Legislature has declared the public interest in preserving the 
environment from anything more than minimal destruction to be supe-
rior to the owner's rights in the use of his land and has given the Com-
mission adequate standards under which to carry out the legislative 
purpose. 
Id. at 751. 
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""38 M.R.S.A. § 484 (3) (1970): 
The proposed development . . . will not adversely affect. . . property 
values in the municipality or in adjoining municipalities. 
1111300 A. 2d 736, 751 (Me., 1973). The court found the property 
value section to be severable and one that did not effect the consti-
tutionality of the remainder of the statute. During the pendancy of 
the Spring Valley case, the Legislature amended the Site Location 
Law eliminating the condition as to property value. Pub. L. 1971, 
Special Session 1972, c. 613, § 5; 300 A. 2d 736, 751 n. 12 (Me., 
1973) . 
117300 A. 2d 736, 752 (Me., 1973). 
II MId. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961); 
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 370-1 (1932); 
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928); 
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 556-7 (1917). 
11\'270 A. 2d 863, 868 (Me., 1970). 
12°"Piecemeal" or "Spot Zoning" is " ... a provision in a zoning 
plan or a modification in such plan, which affects only the use of a 
particular piece of property or a small group of adjoining properties 
and is not related to the general plan for the community as a whole." 
Winslow v. Zoning Board of City of Stamford, 143 Conn. 381, 389, 
122 A. 2d 789, 793-4 (1956). 
121300 A. 2d 736, 753 (Me., 1973). (emphasis added) 
122fd. at 755. 
mId. at 748. 
12~See supra n. 101 - 108 and accompanying text. 
125265 A. 2d 711, 716 (Me., 1970). 
12fiWilkes, supra n. 12, at 161. 
12i38 M.R.S.A. § 485 (Supp. 1973). 
12MInterstate land sales would also be subject to the disclosure 
provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1701 et seq. (Supp. 1973). 
129See supra n. 91 and accompanying text. 
l:l1ICompare supra n. 78 and n. 89. See Wilkes, supra n. 12, at 159. 
"The right to sue for damages when the quality of a man's home-
stead, work place, or life style is ruined is inadequate. A court of 
justice cannot legitimately say that compensation for loss of envi-
ronments is the only remedy it can give." Id. at 160. 
J:lIIn administering the Site Location Law prior to June 21, 1971 
the Environmental Improvement Commission had processed 102 
applications and 61% of these had involved subdivisions. Remarks 
of Rep. Marion Fuller Brown, LEGISLATIVE RECORD-HoUSE, 105th 
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Legislature, 1971, at 4397; 300 A. 2d 736, 744 (footnote 8) (Me., 
1973). Fully 85% of the applications acted on by the Commission in 
its first two years of operation had been for residential subdivisions. 
Remarks of Rep. Earl H. Smith, LEGISLATIVE RECORD-HoUSE, 105th 
Legislature, 1st Special Session, 1972, at 886; 300 A. 2d 736, 745 
(Me., 1973). 
